Name of the Project
Effects of delays in audit results and of incremental audit probabilities on tax compliance
Director
Soraya Román, PhD
Contact: sorayaroman@upb.edu
Summary
In this study, we replicate Solís et al (2018)’s experiment on tax compliance, previously conducted in Costa Rica by the Technological Economics Laboratory of Costa Rica (LEXTEC). One hundred and seventy-seven UPB students participate in the experiment, during which they receive a random income per round and are asked to declare it for tax purposes. We verify whether tax compliance increases when audit results are delayed, and when the subject's audit probability increases after being caught evading taxes.
The study has two objectives: (1) to find similarities and differences between the results of Bolivia and Costa Rica, (2) to explore whether the effects of the treatments vary according to the tax morale and risk aversion of the participants.